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Abstract 
 
Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the valence of a stimulus that results from 
pairing the stimulus with an affective stimulus. Two high-powered studies (total N = 
1161) investigated the nature of the relationship between EC and contingency awareness 
measured as contingency memory. Stronger EC occurred among people with more 
accurate and more confident memory of the pairings. Awareness was a necessary 
condition for EC, but EC was not necessary for awareness. Supporting a propositional 
account of EC, we found evidence for intentional reliance on the contingency for the 
evaluation of stimuli. We also found evidence for the conclusion that contingency 
memory was based both on the actual contingency and on pre-existing attitudes.  
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Evaluative conditioning and conscious knowledge of contingencies:  
A correlational investigation with large samples 
When people are repeatedly exposed to a neutral stimulus that appears in temporal 
proximity to an affective stimulus, their subsequent evaluation of the neutral stimulus 
often becomes more similar to the valence of the affective stimulus. This effect is called 
Evaluative Conditioning (EC; De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, Thomas & Baeyens, 2001; 
Martin & Levey, 1978). EC is considered a form of Pavlovian conditioning in that it 
refers to a change in behaviour that is due to the pairing of stimuli (see De Houwer, 
2007). The neutral stimulus corresponds to the conditioned stimulus (CS), the affective 
stimulus corresponds to the unconditioned stimulus (US), and the change in valence of 
the CS can be seen as the conditioned response. For over 20 years, one of the main 
questions regarding EC has been whether it can occur without the learner’s awareness of 
the CS-US contingency. Because a considerable number of reports claimed to have found 
EC without contingency awareness, EC is also highly relevant to the broader discussion 
about whether any learning can occur without the learner’s awareness (e.g., Mitchell et 
al., 2009; Shanks, in press; Shanks & St. John, 1994). We took advantage of access to 
very large samples to investigate various possible relationships between EC and 
contingency awareness, including the possibility of an EC with no contingency 
awareness.  
The present research tested the following specific questions: (1) Are contingency 
awareness and EC related? We went beyond previous research on this question by 
examining also the causal nature of the relation between awareness and EC. More 
specifically, we investigated (2) whether people intentionally use their memory of the 
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CS-US contingencies when they report about their attitudes toward the CSs, either 
because (2a) the pairing with the US is considered relevant information for evaluation, or 
because (2b) of perceived experimental demand. (3) We also collected evidence about the 
possibility of the opposite causal link: from EC to (false) contingency awareness. We 
tested whether (3a) when there is no actual pairing, false contingency memory forms as a 
result of a pre-existing attitude, and whether (3b) when there is pairing, memory accuracy 
is affected by the match between the US valence and the pre-existing attitudes toward the 
CS. (4) We also tested whether awareness and EC can be unrelated by examining 
whether (4a) Contingency awareness can occur without EC, and whether (4b) EC can 
occur without contingency awareness. (5) Finally, we examined the effect of the number 
of pairings on EC. 
Previous investigations that examined the relationship between contingency 
awareness and EC investigated mainly whether EC can occur without awareness and 
produced mixed results (e.g., De Houwer, Baeyens, & Hendrickx, 1997; De Houwer, 
Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Field, 2000; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Shanks & St. John, 
1994). Several researchers concluded that EC can occur without contingency awareness 
(Baeyens, Eelen & Van den Bergh, 1990; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Olson & Fazio, 
2001, 2002, 2006; Walther, 2002; Walther & Nagengast, 2006). For instance, Olson and 
Fazio (2001, 2002, 2006; Jones, Fazio & Olson, 2009) found significant EC in a sample 
that showed no recognition of which CS-US pairs were presented during the 
conditioning. In another line of work, Walther and Nagengast (2006) found EC only 
among participants who could not recognize the US that was paired with each CS.  
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In contrast with these findings, other investigations found EC only among 
participants who showed awareness of the contingencies (Dawson et. al, 2007; Field, 
2000; Pleyers et. al, 2007, 2009; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl, Unkelbach & 
Corneille, 2009; Wardle, Mitchell & Lovibond, 2007). For instance, when measuring the 
awareness for each CS separately, Pleyers et al. (2007) found EC only for CSs for which 
the contingency with the US was accurately remembered. In another line of work, using a 
trial-by-trial measurement of awareness, Dawson et al. (2007) found EC only when 
participants were able to predict which US would appear after each CS.  
We sought to further the research about the relation between EC and contingency 
awareness in two ways: [1] improving on the sensitivity and reliability of experimental 
effects by increasing statistical power, and [2] using this power not only to examine 
whether the relationship exists, but also to investigate the possible causes of this 
relationship.  
Improving Statistical Power 
One reason for the past contradictory results with regard to the relationship 
between contingency awareness and EC may be low statistical power. Low statistical 
power may produce both failures to find EC in the absence of contingency awareness and 
failures to find a significant relation between EC and contingency awareness. 
Simultaneously, there might be a reporting bias, by which researchers are more likely to 
report studies that found EC without contingency awareness. Studies in which neither 
EC, nor contingency awareness were found, might have been dismissed as being due to 
low power, and never reported, indicating a prejudice against the null hypothesis 
(Greenwald, 1975). To remedy these problems, and to enable powerful tests of numerous 
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conditions and specific sample subsets, this research comprises of two large-scale studies, 
with sample sizes of 570 and 591 participants, respectively. With such samples, tests with 
very specific subsets still have high statistical power. We examined whether people who 
did not show EC still showed contingency awareness, and whether people who did not 
show contingency awareness still showed EC.  
Causal relationships between contingency awareness and attitude 
Going beyond the prior research, we examined not only whether there exists a 
relation between contingency awareness and EC, but also the reasons why such a relation 
would occur. The primary aim of our studies was to investigate the hypothesis that 
contingency awareness may cause EC through propositional processes, more specifically, 
because people intentionally use knowledge about CS-US contingencies to form and 
evaluate propositions about their liking of the CSs (De Houwer, 2007; De Houwer, 
Baeyens, & Field, 2005). Participants might use such a strategy if they believe that 
knowledge about CS-US contingencies provides a valid source of information for 
evaluating propositions about their liking of the CSs. For instance, the fact that a CS is 
consistently followed by a negative US might be seen as a negative property of the CS 
and thus as a reason for endorsing the proposition “the CS is negative.”  
The assumption that EC results from the fact that people intentionally use their 
knowledge of CS-US contingencies in this manner has not been directly tested before, 
and some researchers have contended that this assumption makes little sense. According 
to Shanks (2007), “it is hard to see why a set of cognitive operations would yield such an 
outcome [EC]: There is nothing rational about such transfer of affect” (p. 295). Similarly, 
Baeyens et al. (2009) contended that "there is no causal connection at all between 
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entertaining the propositional belief 'CS refers to (dis)liked US' and (dis)liking a CS" (p. 
199). Putting these assertions into test, the present research examines the possibility that 
people sometimes do intentionally rely on the contingency when they rate the CSs and 
that EC can result from the use of this strategy. 
Propositional processes are conscious by nature and people should thus be able to 
report them under certain conditions (De Houwer, 2009). Therefore, we searched for 
evidence that contingency awareness affects attitudes toward CSs by asking participants 
whether they intentionally used their knowledge of the CS-US contingencies (i.e., their 
contingency knowledge) as basis for rating their liking of the CSs. If intentional use of 
contingency knowledge contributes to EC, and if participants are able to accurately report 
their use of contingency knowledge, then we should observe stronger EC in participants 
who report using their knowledge of the CS-US contingencies. Also, the strength of the 
relation between contingency awareness and EC should depend on whether participants 
report using contingency knowledge when rating their liking of the CSs. Although self-
reports sometimes fail to provide an accurate reflection of the psychological processes 
underlying behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), research has shown that self-reports of 
psychological processes are often in line with observed behavior and can provide useful 
insights in the processes underlying behavior (Smith & Miller, 1978; Vandorpe, De 
Houwer, & Beckers, 2005). As De Houwer (2009) pointed out, self-report data can be 
particularly useful to study the conscious propositional processes that are thought to 
underlie EC. 
In line with most previous studies on the relation between EC and contingency 
awareness, we assessed contingency awareness by measuring contingency memory. We 
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asked participants to report their knowledge of the CS-US contingencies after all CS-US 
pairs were presented. A secondary aim of our studies was to examine whether 
contingency memory reflects not only the actual contingencies but also the liking of the 
CSs. This is an important issue because it would show that contingency memory is not an 
exclusive measure of contingency awareness (Reingold & Merikle, 1988). Stahl et al. 
(2009) recently tested this possibility by examining whether people with reverse EC show 
inaccurate contingency memory. The rationale was that if memory is the result of the 
liking of CSs, then people who prefer a negative CS (CSneg; i.e., a CS paired with a 
negative US) over a positive CS (CSpos; i.e., a CS paired with a positive US) should 
incorrectly infer that the CSneg was paired with USs of positive valence and the CSpos 
was paired with USs of negative valence. Examining the CSs that showed reverse EC, 
Stahl et al. found no evidence for inaccurate contingency memory, and therefore no 
support for the impact of the liking of CSs on contingency memory. The present research 
will repeat these tests with more statistical power, and a more sensitive measure of 
contingency memory.  
As a second way to examine the possibility that attitudes lead to false contingency 
memory, we tested whether contingency memory is related to attitudes when participants 
did not experience CS-US pairings. We included a between-subjects condition with no 
contingency pairings (Experiment 1), and control stimuli that were presented but were 
not paired with USs (Experiment 2). We tested the hypothesis that although no pairing 
occurred, people would tend to report that liked control stimuli were paired with positive 
US more than disliked control stimuli. Finally, we also examined whether pre-existing 
attitudes toward the CSs would affect the contingency memory accuracy. That is, we 
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tested whether people would show more accurate contingency memory when the CS was 
paired with a US that matches the pre-existing attitude toward that CS. 
Overview of the experiments 
In two experiments, after an EC procedure, we measured attitudes and then 
contingency memory. In Experiment 1, the number of pairings (0, 12, 22, or 32) of the 
CS and US was manipulated on a between-subject basis. In Experiment 2, the CS and US 
were paired 4, 8 or 12 times. We manipulated the number of pairings because causal 
relationships in EC might depend on the number of pairings. For instance, perhaps 
intentional processes occur only when the pairings are very salient, as might happen in 
the 32 pairings condition. This manipulation also enabled a statistically powerful study of 
the effect of number of pairings on EC, a factor that was rarely researched in the past (see 
Baeyens et al., 1992, for an exception). The two studies also used different memory 
measures, and different control conditions with no pairing. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. The participants in both studies were volunteers at the Project 
Implicit research website (https://implicit.harvard.edu; see Nosek, 2005 for more 
information). Registered participants were randomly assigned to these studies from a 
large pool of available studies. Once assigned to a study, that participant would never 
again be assigned to the same study on future visits to the Virtual Laboratory. 788 
participants completed Experiment 1, but we removed 37 participants who made too 
many mistakes in the conditioning task (see below). Additionally, some people did not 
respond to all the memory and attitude items. The substantive results are almost identical 
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if we do not remove these participants. However, following the present norm to include 
only participants who completed all the measures, we removed the 193 participants who 
did not respond to all the questions (mostly people who skipped some memory 
questions). That left us with 570 participants (64% women, 35% men, 1% unknown; M 
age = 30.64, SD = 12.51).  
Design. For each participant, one CS was paired with positive valence (CSpos) 
and one was paired with negative valence (CSneg). The assignment of positivity or 
negativity with CSs was manipulated between-subjects, as was the number of CS-US 
pairings: 0 (no pairing), 12, 22 and 32 pairings. The design was 2 (CS type: positive, 
negative; within subjects) x 2 (CS-US assignment: CS1 assigned to positive and CS2 to 
negative USs or vice versa; between subjects) x 4 (number of pairings: 0, 12, 22, 32).  
Procedure and Materials 
CSs. In a pre-test, 655 participants evaluated 12 cartoons characters (Pokemons) 
that were used in prior EC research (Olson & Fazio, 2001), using the same attitude 
measure that was administrated in both studies (see below). In choosing the two CSs, two 
criteria were important: there should not be a strong pre-existing preference for one CS 
over the other, and the two CSs should be rated as close as possible to the neutral point. 
For each participant, 66 difference scores were computed, one for each two-character 
difference. The average difference in liking between the two characters (Ruriri and 
Jigglypuff) that served as the CSs in both studies was fourth smallest difference of the 66 
differences, but the other three pairs with smaller average difference were either 
overwhelmingly liked or disliked, whereas the chosen characters were rated only slightly 
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above neutral. The stimulus image included the name of the character. The same image 
was presented in the procedure and in the attitude and memory measures. 
USs. 10 positive and 10 negative images were taken from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) CD-ROM (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999), a set of 
normed affective stimuli. We also used 6 positive words (Paradise, Pleasure, Cheer, 
Wonderful, Splendid, Love) and 6 negative words (Bomb, Abuse, Sadness, Pain, Poison, 
Grief).  
NS. 9 Neutral IAPS images, 9 Pokemons and 6 words (Table, Chair, Lamp, 
Room, Door, Window) were the neutral filler stimuli (NS). Another Pokemon (always the 
same one, Diglett) was used as the target stimulus (see Learning Procedure). 
Learning Procedure. In the consent form, participants were told that the study 
may help us understand how people think, and provide an educational, engaging 
experience. They then read the instructions for the learning procedure, presented as the 
Hit task because participants must hit the space bar when they see the target stimulus (see 
next). We adapted the surveillance conditioning procedure used by Olson and Fazio 
(2001, 2002, 2006; Jones, Fazio & Olson, 2009). We chose this procedure because 
according to the published reports, it has almost always produced EC without awareness, 
and because it is relatively short, making it more appropriate for a web study. In the 
procedure, pairs of stimuli were presented next to each other in rapid succession without 
an interval between them. Each pair included one of the following two stimuli: two NSs, 
an NS and the target, or a CS with a US. The locations (left or right) of the two stimuli 
were randomly assigned in each trial. Each pair was presented for 1200ms (in comparison 
to 1500ms in the original procedure). The next pair appeared as soon as the previous pair 
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disappeared. Participants were instructed to hit the space-bar every time a target stimulus 
appeared (the Pokemon character Diglett). This character was never used as a CS or US. 
The target stimulus was more similar to the CSs than to the USs because like them it was 
a cartoon character with its name printed on its picture, and because it was rated as 
relatively neutral in the pre-test. This might have increased the attention paid to the CSs 
and filler Pokemon stimuli in comparison to the affective and neutral IAPS stimuli. 
In the practice block, the target stimulus and each of the two CSs appeared twice 
together with a US (except for the no-pairing condition, described separately below). The 
CSpos appeared with positive USs (USpos) and the CSneg with negative USs (USneg). 
After each stimulus pair that included a CS or the target, between 2 and 6 NS-NS pairs 
appeared. The exact number was determined randomly on each occasion. 
Two identical critical blocks came after the practice block. The target stimulus 
appeared 10 times in each critical block. Each CS appeared 5, 10 or 15 times in each 
block, depending on the number of pairings condition. This was in addition to the 2 
pairings in the practice block, resulting in 12, 22 and 32 pairings in the entire task. The 
number of filler NS-NS pairs that appeared after each CS-US pair varied (randomly) 
from 1 to 20 with the goal to present 90-100 trials in each block. The stimuli for USs and 
NSs were selected randomly until the list of stimuli was exhausted, and then they were 
selected randomly again so that each participant never saw a CS appearing with the same 
US more than twice. To summarize in another way, in the 32 pairings condition, 64 
(32%) of about 200 trials included one of the CSs. In the 12 pairings condition, 24 (12%) 
of about 200 trials included one of the CSs.  
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In the no-pairing condition, each CS appeared 22 times throughout the procedure 
(twice in the practice block, 10 times in each block), always with one of the 24 NSs. In 
that condition, in each block, appeared 10 NS-USpos and 10 NS-USneg pairs. The NSs 
were selected randomly from the list of 24 NSs. On average, each NS was paired once 
with a USpos and once with a USneg. 
Attitude measure. The two CS Pokemons, 3 NS Pokemons, and the target (NS) 
Pokemon were presented together on the same screen in a randomized order. Participants 
rated each Pokemon on a 9-point scale with the following instructions: Please provide 
your immediate feelings (your very first gut reaction), how warm or cold you feel toward 
the following characters (0 = coldest feelings, 4 = neutral, 8 = warmest feelings).  
Manipulation awareness. After the evaluation of the stimuli, participants were 
asked: For some participants, during the first task, there was one character that always 
appeared with positive images and words and one that always appeared with negative 
images and words, do you think it happened in your case? The question gave participants 
the impression that pairing might or might not have occurred in the learning procedure. 
The response options were No, I did not notice if that happened in my task and Yes, that 
happened in my task.  
Contingency memory. In the next screen, participants were presented with the 
images and names of the two CSs, and they responded to two specific contingency 
memory items. In one memory question participants indicated which of the two CSs was 
the CSpos, and in a second item they indicated which was the CSneg: (1) During the first 
task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with positive images and 
words?; And, (2) Which of the two characters was consistently presented with negative 
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images and words? There were six response options: Jigglypuff (certainly), Jigglypuff 
(probably), Jigglypuff (guess), Ruriri (guess), Ruriri (probably), Ruriri (certainly). The 
six response options were coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with one point difference between each 
option on the scale. The items were coded such that higher values indicated greater 
confidence in the accurate association and then averaged. For example, if Jigglypuff was 
the CSpos and Ruriri was the CSneg, Jigglypuff (certainly) was scored as 2.5 and the 
response Ruriri (certainly) was scored -2.5 for the first item and vice versa for the second 
item. In summary, higher scores indicated better memory (i.e., more accurate and 
confident).  
The memory score for each participant was the mean score of the two memory 
items. To illustrate, the minimum memory score of people who answered the two 
memory questions correctly was 0.5 (if they indicated guessing in both responses). A 
score of 0 means that the respondent had one correct and one wrong response with an 
equal confidence level. We defined accurate memory as any score larger than 0.  
Perceived effects of the pairings.  After the memory questionnaire, we asked 
whether people thought they used the pairings as information when they rated the CSs: 
When asked how much you like the characters, did you intentionally take into account 
whether the character often appeared with positive or negative words or images? With 
the response options Definitely no (coded as -2), Probably no (-1), Not sure (0), Probably 
yes (1), Definitely yes (2).  
A second question measured the participants’ perceived demand compliance: 
When I rated the characters, I thought that this research might want me to like the 
character that was paired with positive items and dislike the character that was paired 
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with negative items, so that is exactly what I did. The responses were on a 6-point scale 
from Strongly agree (coded as 2.5) to Strong disagree (coded as -2.5).  
To summarize the overall procedure, the experiment started with the learning 
task, followed by the attitude measurement, a question about the manipulation awareness, 
the contingency memory questionnaire and then the measurement of people's perception 
of the effect of the pairing on their attitude. 
Results and Discussion 
Performance in the Learning Procedure  
On average, participants correctly hit the space-bar after almost all 20 
appearances of the target in the two blocks (M = 19.64, SD = 1.55). They usually did not 
hit the space-bar after stimuli other than the target (M = 2.21, SDs = 9.31). The minimum 
appropriate performance was set as at least 15 correct hits and less than 7 false alarms, 
this removed less than 5% of the sample. 
Overall effects 
EC occurred and was unaffected by the number of pairings. As an index of EC, 
we subtracted the attitude rating for the CSneg from the attitude rating for the CSpos. The 
average preference for CSpos was .53 (SD = 2.36), which was significantly larger than 0 
(which indicates no preference), t(570) = 5.35, p < .0001, d = .231. EC did not vary 
across the number of pairings conditions. As detailed in Table 1, the effect appeared 
smallest in the 22 pairings condition, but the difference between the number of pairings 
conditions in an ANOVA was not significant, F < 1.  
(Table 1 about here) 
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 Manipulation awareness was low and it moderated EC. In the experimental 
conditions (those that presented CS-US pairing), most people (72%) reported that they 
did not notice that pairing occurred in the learning procedure. This was not moderated by 
the number of pairings, F < 1 (in an ANOVA with number of pairing as a predictor of 
manipulation awareness). Some participants (15%) in the control condition reported 
noticing pairing (although pairing did not occur), suggesting that the response was 
sometimes based on guessing or false contingency detection. Still, participants in the 
experimental conditions were more likely than control participants to report that they 
noticed the pairing, χ2(1, N = 570) = 11.85, p = .0006, suggesting that at least some 
participants noticed the contingency manipulation, or inferred it from their attitude 
change. People who reported manipulation awareness (N = 158) showed EC of moderate 
scale, M = 1.42 (SD = 2.74), t(157) = 6.49, p < .0001, d = .52, whereas people who did 
not report noticing any pairing (N = 413), showed very small and marginally significant 
EC, M = 0.19 (SD = 2.10), t(412) = 1.83, p = .07, d = .09. These results suggest that 
noticing or inferring the pairing was important for reliable EC. 
 Contingency memory was good and unaffected by the number of pairings. The 
memory score (M = .67, SD = 1.18) was positive for most people (68%), and was 
significantly above zero (chance), t(570) = 13.57, p  < .0001, d = .57. The number of 
pairings did not affect memory, F < 1 in a single factor (number of pairings) ANOVA. 
EC was Related to Contingency Memory. Stronger EC (i.e., more preference for 
CSpos) was related to better memory (i.e., more accurate and more confident) for the 
contingencies, r(570)  = .36, p < .001. The number of pairings did not moderate this 
relationship, as revealed by the results of a regression with EC as dependent variable and 
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contingency memory, number of pairings and their interaction as predictors. The 
regression did not reveal an interaction or a significant effect of number of pairings, ts < 
1. It only revealed the relationship between memory and EC, ß = .43, t(570) = 3.69, p < 
.0001. Now that we have established the presence of a relation between EC and 
contingency memory, we investigate possible causal links that may explain this 
relationship.  
Memory Affected EC through Intentional Processes  
To test the possibility of a causal effect of contingency memory on EC through 
intentional processes, we examined whether reported reliance on contingency memory 
moderated the relation between EC and contingency memory and whether the magnitude 
of EC differed between participants who reported using contingency memory and those 
who reported not using contingency memory. Then, we tested the role of demand 
compliance by repeating the same tests with reported demand compliance instead of the 
reported contingency memory reliance. Finally, we examined whether reported reliance 
on contingency memory was related to EC even among people who did not think that 
they complied with experimental demand. 
Reported reliance on contingency memory moderated the memory-EC 
relationship. Most participants (69%) responded Probably no or Definitely no when 
asked whether they took into account the contingencies when evaluating the CSs. 
Fourteen percent replied Not sure, 12% reported Probably yes and 5% reported Definitely 
yes. The EC-memory relationship was weakest for those reporting that they did not rely 
on the contingencies and strongest for those reporting that they did. This conclusion was 
supported by the results of a regression analysis with EC as an outcome and contingency 
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memory accuracy, reported contingency reliance, and their interaction as predictors. The 
interaction was significant, ß = .14, t(566) = 2.54, p = .009, reflecting moderation of the 
memory-EC relationship depending on the self-reported intentional use of the 
contingencies. To illustrate this moderation, the attitude/memory correlation among 
participants who reported that they probably or definitely did not rely on the   
contingencies when evaluating the CSs was r(396) = .25, p < .0001 , in comparison to 
r(174) = .40, p < .0001 in the rest of the sample. Reported contingency reliance was also 
a significant predictor of EC, ß = .12, t(566) = 2.21, p = .03, indicating a stronger EC 
among those who reported more reliance on the contingencies. As found earlier, memory 
was another significant predictor of EC in that regression, ß = .34, t(566) = 7.35, p < 
.0001.  
We also examined the relationship between reported contingency reliance and EC 
after partialling the memory score (because both were positively related to memory). The 
partial correlation was significant, r(570) = .21, p < .0001, suggesting that the 
relationship between EC and reported contingency reliance cannot be explained 
completely by memory accuracy and confidence. This rules out the possibility that better 
memory exclusively caused both stronger EC and more reported reliance on memory. 
Instead, those who reported more reliance on the memory for the evaluation showed 
stronger EC even when memory was equated. This supports the assumption that people 
who reported reliance on contingency memory when rating the CSs indeed relied on 
memory and showed EC as a result of that. 
To illustrate the contribution of reported contingency reliance to the overall EC, 
we compared EC between people who did not report reliance and people reported 
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reliance. People who reported that they definitely or probably did not use their memory 
of the contingencies did not show EC, M = .12 (SD = 2.08), t(396) = 1.14, p = .22, d = 
.06, whereas people who reported that they definitely or probably used the contingency 
memory, showed large EC, M = 2.07 (SD = 2.75), t(94) = 7.32, p < .0001, d = .75. 
Among people who had accurate memory, EC was found even when people reported 
definitely or probably not relying on the contingencies, M = 0.60 (SD = 2.16), t(243) = 
4.31, p < .0001, d = .27. Hence, people who remember the pairing accurately show EC 
even if they believe that they did not use their memory of the pairing. Note, however, that 
this effect was much smaller than the effect shown by the 84 participants who had 
accurate contingency memory and reported reliance on memory, d = .82.  
EC was related to perceived demand compliance. We repeated the same analyses 
with reported demand compliance. Seven percent of the participants moderately or 
strongly agreed with the statement that the desire to follow the researchers’ expectations 
caused them to report liking of the CSpos more than the CSneg; another 12% slightly 
agreed with the statement, and the rest (81%) disagreed with this statement (slightly – 
12%, moderately – 16% or strongly – 53%). That is, some people perceived such demand 
and thought that they followed it. We tested whether these reports were related to the 
actual EC-memory relationship. Although participants who reported not basing their 
behavior on experimenter demand showed correlation between EC and memory, r(462) = 
.26, participants who (slightly, moderately or strongly) agreed with this statement showed 
a stronger correlation, r(108) = .58. This increase was significant, as revealed in a 
multiple regression analysis with EC as the outcome and the predictors contingency 
memory score, reported demand compliance and their interaction. A significant 
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interaction effect, ß = .25, t(566) = 4.37, p < .0001, suggested stronger EC-memory 
relationship for those trying to follow the experimenter’s expectations. In that regression, 
memory also predicted EC, ß = .49, t(566) = 9.07, p < .0001, but perceived demand 
compliance did not, ß = .03, t < 1. 
To illustrate the contribution of perceived demand compliance to EC, people who 
(slightly, moderately or strongly) disagreed with the demand compliance statement, 
showed a small EC, M = .27 (SD = 2.18), t(462) = 2.68, p = .008, d = .12, which was 
stronger among the subset that had accurate memory, M = .71 (SD = 2.24), t(299) = 5.50, 
p < .0001, d = .32. In comparison, the rest of the sample, people who reported demand 
compliance, showed a much larger effect, M = 1.62 (SD = 2.75), t(108) = 6.13, p < .0001, 
d = .59 (which was even larger among the 84 participants who reported demand 
compliance and had accurate contingency memory, d = .83). This indicates that although 
perceived demand compliance is not the sole contributor to EC, it is an important one. 
EC was related to reported contingency memory even when participants reported 
no demand compliance.  Compliance with perceived demand implies that contingency 
memory is used to rate the CSs. Therefore, it is not surprising that reports of reliance on 
memory and reports of demand compliance were positively related, r(746) = .44, p < 
.0001. The propositional account that we tested in this research contends, however, that 
people rely on their contingency memory not because of perceived demand but because 
they believe that the CS-US contingency provides relevant information about the valence 
of CSs. If that is correct, then reporting contingency reliance should moderate EC even 
among participants who reported that they did not comply with perceived demand  
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We examined this assumption using the data of the 305 participants (54% of the 
participants not including the control group with no contingency pairings) who strongly 
disagreed with the demand compliance statement, reporting that they did not follow 
perceived demand. Among this subset, a regression analysis showed that contingency 
reliance was a significant predictor of EC, ß = .17, t(303) = 3.03, p < .01. To illustrate, in 
this subset, participants who reported that they probably or definitely did not rely on 
contingency memory (N =262), showed no EC, M = .05 (SD = 2.01), t < 1, d = .02, 
whereas the rest of the participants in this subset showed significant EC, M = 1.05 (SD = 
2.77), t(42) = 2.48, p = .01, d = .38. Hence, more reported reliance on the contingency 
memory was related to stronger EC even when this reliance was not perceived by the 
participants as resulting from demand compliance.  
Attitudes can Affect Contingency Memory 
We next examined suggestive evidence that EC may affect contingency memory. 
We did that by testing whether pre-existing attitudes caused false memory in the no-
pairing condition, and whether pre-existing attitudes also affected memory when 
contingencies occurred. 
False contingency memory. In the control, no-pairing condition, we computed 
memory and attitude measures by arbitrarily choosing one of the CSs (Jigglypuff) to be 
the CSpos. We found that the attitude and memory scores were related, r(176) = .33, p < 
.0001, suggesting a causal link from attitude to memory because there was nothing to 
remember.  
One might argue that when guessing in the memory question, it is sensible to use 
the attitude as information and thus to guess about memory based on attitude. However, 
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the memory-attitude relationship was not limited to people who guessed. Fifty nine 
participants in the no pairing condition (i.e., no contingency exposure in reality) 
indicated probable or certain confidence in their contingency memory. This subgroup 
still showed an attitude-memory relationship, r(57) = .44, p = .0006. This suggests that 
the attitude did not only affect guessing in the memory question, it also affected the 
experience of memory, causing people to believe that they witnessed a pairing that did 
not occur. 
This false memory confidence was related to attitude extremity. We computed an 
attitude extremity index for each CS, as the distance between the evaluation and the mid-
point of the evaluation scale. The participant’s attitude extremity index was the average 
of the attitude extremity index for the two CSs. The certainty index and attitude extremity 
index were correlated, r(176) = .29, p < .0001. That is, people who had stronger attitudes 
towards the CSs were more certain about their (false) contingency memory.  
A skeptic might argue that people sometimes just happen to acquire false 
contingencies memory while encoding the pairing during the learning task, and that this 
false memory caused the attitude and not vice versa. However, the same 59 participants 
in the no-pairing condition who indicated that they felt probable or certain confidence 
about their memory tended to remember that Jigglypuff was paired with positive stimuli 
and that Ruriri was paired with negative stimuli, M = 1.70, SD = 3.04, t(57) = 4.23, p < 
.0001, d = .56. There is no reason that a random, incidental pairing would cause this 
memory bias. It is more reasonable to assume that despite our attempt to choose equally 
liked CSs, there was still a slight overall preference for one stimulus over the other, 
which caused this false memory bias.  
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Attitude affected memory also in the pairing conditions. Following the same 
rationale, we also tested for memory bias in conditions that had pairings. If pre-existing 
attitudes did not affect contingency memory, then people should show an equally 
accurate memory regardless of the pairing condition. Yet, people were more accurate and 
confident in their memory when Jigglypuff was paired with positive valence and Ruriri 
was paired with negative valence (M = .84, SD = 1.11), than when the opposite pairing 
occurred (M = .52, SD = 1.23), t(600) = 3.35, p < .001, d = .27. Notice that the memory 
bias in the no-pairing condition (with different participants) also suggested a preference 
for Jigglypuff over Ruriri.  
Attitudes were not the sole cause for contingency memory. Repeating Stahl et al.'s 
(2009) test of the inference-from-attitude account, we examined whether participants who 
showed preference for the CSneg over the CSpos also showed a reversed contingency 
memory. Replicating Stahl et al.'s (2009) null effect in a more statistically powerful test,  
the memory accuracy of these reverse-EC participants was not different than zero, M = 
.11, (SD = 1.09), t(174) = 1.32, p = .19, d = .10. This indicates that although the previous 
tests found that attitudes affected contingency memory, attitudes were not influential 
enough to reverse the contingency memory when the actual contingencies were in the 
opposite direction to the CS preference.  
Evidence for Direct Link from Pairing to Contingency Awareness or EC 
 Although we found a relationship between contingency memory and EC, and 
evidence for a causal relationship between the two, it does not rule out the possibility that 
contingency pairings could sometimes cause one without the other. In this large sample 
many people did not show accurate memory, and many people did not show EC. This 
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enabled highly reliable tests of EC without accurate memory and accurate memory 
without EC.  
There was no standard EC without accurate contingency memory. We tested EC 
among the subsample of participants who had inaccurate memory for the contingencies 
and found reverse EC: a preference for the CSneg over CSpos, M = -.54 (SD = 1.78), 
t(187) = -4.16, p < .0001, d = -.30  A similar reverse effect was also observed by Stahl, 
Unkelbach and Corneille (2009). An ANOVA with the number of pairings as a 3-level 
factor and the preference for the CSpos as a dependent measure showed no effect, F(2, 
184) = -2.48, p = .09, 
2
pη = .02, indicating no moderation of the reverse EC by the 
number of pairings.  
Participants who did not show EC still showed accurate contingency memory. 
Fifty five percent of the participants did not show EC: they either preferred CSneg over 
CSpos or rated the two as equally likable. These participants still remembered, on 
average, that the CSpos was paired with positive stimuli and that the CSneg was paired 
with negative stimuli, M = .63, SD = 1.15, t(326) = 9.85, p < .0001, d = .55. Of those, 
examining only the participants who rated their memory confidence as probable or 
certain, they showed even more accurate memory, M = 1.12, SD = 1.32, t(175) = 11.23, p 
< .0001, d = .85. These findings probably reflect the fact that the pairing manipulation 
affects memory much more than it affects attitude. It may also suggest that memory is not 
sufficient for EC, and that, as reported earlier, a robust EC emerges only when people 
actively use this memory when they evaluate the CSs.  
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Experiment 2 
The first experiment found evidence for a relationship between contingency 
awareness and EC, for a causal link from awareness to EC through intentional processes, 
sometimes because of perceived demand compliance, for a causal link from pre-existing 
attitudes to false and real contingency awareness, and no evidence for EC without 
contingency awareness. Because we were surprised by the lack of evidence of EC 
without awareness, we conducted a second experiment to see whether these findings 
would replicate with a few procedural modifications. The main change was that we 
reduced the number of pairings to 4, 8 or 12. Perhaps with less pairings, the contingency 
will be less easy to detect, and EC without accurate contingency memory will be more 
likely. We also modified the memory questions about the CSs, to make them less 
dependent one on the other. Finally, we added memory probes about the filler Pokemons 
(i.e., the Pokemons that were never paired with USs), to examine whether people would 
show false contingency awareness, and whether this false awareness would be related to 
pre-existing attitudes toward each filler.  
Methods 
Participants. 673 participants completed the study. Of those, we removed 19 
participants who made too many mistakes in the conditioning task. Another 66 
participants were not included in the analyses because they did not respond to all the 
questions in the questionnaire (like in Experiment 1, the test results are virtually identical 
with these participants). That left us with 591 participants (88% of the sample, 69% 
women, 30% men, 1% unknown; M age = 30.37, SD = 11.72).  
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Design. 2 (CS type: positive, negative; within subjects) x 2 (CS-US assignment: 
CS1 assigned to positive and CS2 to negative USs or vice versa; between subjects) x 3 
(number of pairings: 4, 8, 12; between subjects). 
Procedure and Materials 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 1. The learning procedure was 
similar, only without presenting the CSs in the practice block. In each of the two critical 
blocks, each CS was paired 2, 4 or 6 times, out of the approximately 100 pairings in the 
block. The attitude measure was the same as in Experiment 1 (and included the filler 
Pokemons).  
The memory questionnaires were modified. The manipulation awareness question 
was the same as before, but with six response options (instead of two): from It did not 
happen in my task (certainly) to Yes, that happened in my task (certainly). Between these 
two extreme options, participants could choose the same two statements but with 
(probably) or (guess) at the end of the statement, instead of (certainly). The six response 
options were coded from -2.5 (certainty that there was no pairing) to 2.5 (certainty that 
there was pairing).  
In the contingency memory questionnaire, participants indicated whether each 
Pokemon (the two CSs and the 3 fillers) was a CSpos or a CSneg. Participants were 
instructed to indicate their contingency memory about the same Pokemons from the 
attitude measure: For each of the following characters, please indicate whether it was 
consistently (i.e., always) presented with positive or negative images and words? The 6 
response options ranged from With positive images and words (certainly) to With 
negative images and words (certainly), with (probably) and (guess) options for each in 
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between the extremes. Like Experiment 1, responses to the CSs were coded so that higher 
values indicated greater memory accuracy, and were coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with one 
point difference between each option on the scale. The responses to the two CS items 
(Ruriri and Jigglypuff) were averaged. Like in Experiment 1, an average score of 2.5 
indicates perfectly accurate memory, and an average score of -2.5 indicates completely 
inaccurate memory. 
The measures of perceived effect of the pairings on the liking rating were 
identical to Experiment 1. 
Results 
The findings mostly replicated the results of Experiment 1, with a few minor 
changes, usually related to the fact that there was no significant EC when the number of 
CS-US pairings was smaller than 12.  
Overall effects 
EC occurred and was affected by the number of pairings. Because we reduced the 
number of pairings substantially, the overall EC effect was very small, M = .26, SD = 
2.21, t(591) = 2.93, p = .004, d = .12 (Table 1). A regression analysis showed that EC 
was significantly larger with more pairings, ß = .09, t(589) = 2.15, p = .03. Specifically, 
there was no EC in the 4 pairings condition, M = -.02, SD = 2.18, t(210) < 1, small and 
non-significant EC in the 8 pairings condition, M = .29, SD = 2.34, t(191) = 1.70, p = .09, 
d = .12, and larger and significant EC in the 12 pairings condition, M = .49, SD = 2.21, 
t(190) = 3.01, p = .003, d = .22.  
Manipulation awareness was low and it moderated EC. Only 18% of the 
participants reported that pairing probably or certainly occurred in the learning task. 
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Another 25% of the participants reported guessing that it occurred. The other 57% of the 
participants said that it did not occur with different levels of certainty. These reports 
moderated EC, ß = .09, t(589) = 2.35, p = .02. In fact, EC was significant only among 
participants who reported that pairing probably occurred, M = .61, SD = 2.53, t(80) = 
2.16, p = .03, d = .24, or that it certainly occurred, M = .1.72, SD = 0.56, t(25) = 3.06, p = 
.005, d = 3.07. All the rest of the sample did not show EC, M = 0.10, SD = 2.17, t(486) = 
1, p = .32, d = .05 (d = .04, t < 1, among participants who reported guessing that pairing 
did occur).  
Contingency memory was poor and was affected by the number of pairings.  
Most people (61%) did not show accurate memory, with most of them (42%) 
showing a memory score of 0, thinking that both CSs were paired with the same valence. 
But, because there were more people who remembered the correct pairing (39%) than the 
opposite pairing (19%), the memory score was significantly accurate (larger than zero) 
even in the 4-pairing condition, t(210) = 2.99, p = .0031, d = .21. Memory improved 
when the number of pairings increased, as revealed in the regression in which memory 
score was predicted by number of pairing, ß = .09, t(589) = 2.15, p = .03 (Table 1). 
Notice that people were generally more accurate in Experiment 1 than in 
Experiment 2 (see Table 1). The reason was probably the difference between the memory 
measures that were used in each experiment. In Experiment 1, one memory question 
forced participants to choose between Jigglypuff and Ruriri as the CSpos, and the other 
forced them to choose the CSneg between the two. That is, the questions suggested that 
one of these two was paired with USpos and the other with USneg. Because of that, there 
was a strong negative relationship between the two items, r(746) = -.81, p < .0001. In 
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contrast, in Experiment 2, participants had to indicate for each stimulus, whether it was 
paired with positive or negative stimuli. Therefore, in Experiment 2, participants were not 
led to believe that one CS was paired with positive stimuli and the other with negative 
stimuli. In line with that, in Experiment 2, there was no relationship between the 
contingency memory for Jigglypuff and the contingency memory for Ruriri, r(591) = -
.06, p = .13. Additionally, in Experiment 2, there was no pairing in the first practice 
block, which might have made the pairing less noticeable.  
The number of pairings did not affect EC when memory was accurate. There was 
no moderation of the number of pairings on EC when only participants with accurate 
contingency memory were included in the analysis, F < 1.  To illustrate, among 
participants with accurate memory, EC was virtually identical in the 4 pairings (M = .99, 
SD = 2.11) and the 12 pairings (M = .92, SD = 2.60) conditions. This may suggest a 
relationship between the effects of the number of pairings on EC and on contingency 
memory. For instance, one effect may mediate the other. 
EC was related to contingency memory. Like in Experiment 1, stronger EC was 
related to better contingency memory, r(591)  = .36, p < .001. The number of pairings did 
not moderate this relationship, as revealed by a regression that predicted EC with 
contingency memory, number of pairings and their interaction. The regression did not 
find a significant interaction, ß = -.19, t(587) = -1.82, p = .07, nor was there a significant 
effect of number of pairings, ß = .06, t(587) = 1.57, p = .12. Only the contingency 
memory score was a significant predictor of EC, ß = .53, t(587) = 5.12, p < .0001. This 
indicates that contingency memory and EC relationship were similarly related regardless 
of the number of pairings.  
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Memory Affected EC through Intentional Processes 
 Reported reliance on contingency memory moderated the memory-EC 
relationship. Most participants (76%) reported responded Probably no or Definitely no 
when asked whether they took into account the contingencies when evaluating the CSs. 
Fourteen percent replied Not sure, 8% reported Probably yes and 2% reported Definitely 
yes. As in Experiment 1, reported reliance on memory moderated the relationship 
between contingency memory and EC. This was indicated by a significant interaction 
effect, in a regression that predicted EC with contingency memory, ß = .39, t(587) = 8.64, 
p < .0001, reported reliance, ß = .05, t(587) = 1.18, p = .24 and their interaction, ß = .11, 
t(587) = 2.29, p = .02. When the interaction term between the number of pairings, the 
memory score and the reported reliance was added to the same regression, this interaction 
term was a significant predictor of EC, ß = .24, t(586) = 2.20, p = .03, and the memory by 
reported reliance interaction term was no longer significant, ß = -.12, t(586) = -1.09, p = 
.28. The reason was revealed when we repeated the regression analysis separately for 
each number of pairings condition. We found that the reported reliance moderated the 
memory-EC relationship only in the 12 pairings condition, ß = .27, t(186) = 3.38, p = 
.001, and not in the 4 and 8 pairings conditions, ts < 1. This was probably because of 
reduced statistical power caused by the low number of participants who reported relying 
on contingency memory in the 4 and 8 pairing conditions. For instance, in the 4 pairings 
condition, none of the participants reported a definite reliance on the contingencies, and 
in the 8 pairings conditions, only 4 people reported definite reliance. The 12 pairings 
condition had 10 people who reported definite reliance.  
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To illustrate the contribution of reported reliance to overall EC, participants in the 
12 pairings condition who reported that they definitely or probably did not use their 
memory of the contingencies (72% of the 12-pairings group) showed a small non-
significant EC, t(135) = 1. 75, p = .08, d = .15, and people who reported probable of 
definite reliance (13% of the participants in the 12-pairings group) showed large EC, 
t(24) = 3.21, p = .004, d = 1.01. The rest of the participants in the 12-pairings group 
reported being unsure whether they intentionally relied on the contingencies. 
The memory-EC relationship was moderated by perceived demand when there 
were more than 4 pairings. Seven percent of the participants moderately or strongly 
agreed with the statement that the desire to follow the researchers’ expectations caused 
them to report liking of the CSpos more than the CSneg; another 13% slightly agreed 
with the statement, and the rest (80%) disagreed with this statement (slightly – 11%, 
moderately – 13% or strongly – 56%). This is comparable to what was observed in 
Experiment 1. Participants who reported not basing their behavior on experimenter 
demand (i.e., they slightly, moderately or strongly disagreed with the demand statement), 
still showed correlation between EC and memory, r(470) = .30, which seemed smaller 
than the correlation shown by participants who (slightly, moderately or strongly) agreed 
with this statement, r(121) = .49. But, this difference was not significant, as was revealed 
in a multiple regression analysis with EC as the outcome and the predictors contingency 
memory score, ß = .39, t(587) = 8.68, p < .0001, reported demand, ß = .06, t(587) = 1.30, 
p = .19, and their interaction, ß = .08, t(587) = 1.73, p = .08. The lack of interaction does 
not support the moderation hypothesis, but this was due to the 4-pairing condition. 
Without participants in that condition, the interaction was a significant predictor, ß = .14, 
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t(377) = 2.44, p = .02. Perceived demand contributed to the EC effect when the number 
of pairings ranged from 8 to 12 (and between 12 and 32 in Experiment 1), but not when 
there were only 4 pairings per CS. Probably, participants in that condition were less likely 
to notice the pairing and infer the experimenter expectation as the other participants. 
EC was related to reported contingency memory even when participants reported 
no demand compliance.  Like in Experiment 1, it was important to examine whether 
reporting contingency reliance moderated EC even among participants who report that 
they did not follow perceived demand to prefer the CSpos over the CSneg. We examined 
this assumption with the 329 participants (56% of the sample) who strongly disagreed 
with the demand compliance statement. Among this subset, a regression analysis showed 
that contingency reliance was a significant predictor of EC, ß = .14, t(327) = 2.54, p = 
.01. To illustrate, participants who reported that they probably or definitely did not rely 
on contingency memory (N =287), showed no EC, M = -.10 (SD = 2.30), t < 1, d = -.04, 
whereas the rest of the participants in this subset showed a stronger sign of EC, M =.69 
(SD = 2.09), t(40) = 1.93, p = .06, d = .33. Because these results are similar to those 
found in Experiment 1, it bolsters the conclusion that more reported reliance on the 
contingency memory was related to stronger EC even when this reliance was not 
perceived by the participants as resulting from demand compliance.  
The Effect of Attitudes on Contingency Memory 
False contingency memory. The average correlation between the contingency 
memory and attitude for the 3 fillers (for which there were no contingencies) was r(590) 
= .34, p < .0001, similar to the average correlation for the CSs, r(590) = .33, p < .0001. 
The average correlation between certainty in the contingency memory about each filler 
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and the extremity of the attitude toward that filler was r(590) = .21, p < .0001, in 
comparison to r(590) = .18, p < .0001, for the CSs. Because there was no contingency 
pairing for the filler stimuli, and thus no experience to create the memory, this correlation 
implies a causal relationship from attitude to contingency memory. 
To build support that this correlation was caused by pre-existing attitudes and not 
by random false memory, we examined whether for each of the three fillers, there was a 
memory bias among people who indicated that they did not guess the contingencies for 
that filler stimulus. We found that one of the fillers was typically remembered as being 
paired with positive stimuli, M = 1.59, SD = 1.57, t(178) = 13.50, p < .0001, d = 1.01, and 
the other two were typically remembered as being paired with negative stimuli, Ms = -
.63, -1.11, SDs = 1.58, 1.39, t(118, 145) = -4.32, -9.65, ps < .0001, ds = .40, .80. These 
memory biases matched the average evaluation of the three fillers in the pilot pre-test 
study that surveyed people’s evaluation of each stimulus. In that pre-test (N = 655), the 
filler stimulus that was often remembered as being paired with positive stimuli in this 
experiment was rated as significantly more likeable than the neutral point on the scale, d  
= 1.37; the two other filler stimuli were significantly less likeable than the neutral point, 
ds = -.35, -.95. Therefore, we conclude that the evaluation of the three fillers was the 
cause of the contingency memory.  
Attitude also affected the CS Contingency Memory. Following the same rationale 
we also tested for memory bias regarding the CSs. We chose the CSs because they were 
both rated close to neutral (4.72 and 4.88, for Ruriri and Jigglypuff, respectively, on a 
scale between 0 and 8), yet they were still rated slightly above neutral (ds = .37, .49). In 
line with that, people showed a memory bias, remembering, on average, that these stimuli 
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were paired with positive USs, Ms = .34, .28, SDs = 1.11, 0.94, t(591, 591) = 7.38, 7.21, 
ps < .0001, ds = .31, .30. This suggests that pre-existing attitudes affected contingency 
memory even for stimuli that were actually paired with USs, and supports the speculation 
that attitudes that were produced by EC may also affect contingency memory. 
Attitudes were not the sole cause for contingency memory. Repeating the tests of 
of Stahl and colleagues (2009) for the inference-from-attitude account yielded interesting 
results. The 12 pairings condition replicated our findings from Experiment 1 and also 
Stahl and colleagues findings: participants who showed preference for the CSneg over the 
CSpos did not show a reversed contingency memory, M = .11, (SD = .74), t(57) = 1.17, p 
= .25, d = .15. However, participants in the 4 pairings condition almost showed a 
significant reverse memory, M = -.13, (SD = .58), t(75) = -1.89, p = .06, d = -.22. The 8 
pairings condition was between the two other conditions, but not significantly different 
than zero, M = -.06, (SD = .61), t(70) < 1, d = -.10. A regression analysis with number of 
pairings as a predictor of contingency memory, including only participants who preferred 
the CSneg over the CSpos, revealed that this decline in accurate contingency memory 
was significant, ß = .15, t(200) = 2.11, p = .04. We understand these results as describing 
the mutual influence of attitudes and actual contingency on the contingency memory. 
When there are enough pairings for noticing the pairing, preference for the CSneg may 
damage contingency memory but not reverse it. However, when there are only a few 
pairings, the effect of the actual contingencies on the contingency memory weakens and, 
in Experiment 2, the attitudes were almost strong enough to induce contingency memory 
that is opposite to the actual contingency that occurred in the task. 
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The memory-attitude relationship was not due to individual differences in 
response style. The attitude and memory ratings of five different stimuli enabled a test 
whether the relationships found in this research between attitude extremity and memory 
certainty were due to individual differences in how people use such scales. For instance, 
perhaps people who tend to use the middle of the scale in the attitude measure also did 
that in the memory measure. If that is the case, then the attitude-memory relationship 
should be similar regardless of whether the attitude and the memory pertain to the same 
stimulus or to a different stimulus. That is, if this relationship is simply due to scale 
usage, then the reported confidence in one’s memory toward one CS should be equally 
related to the extremity of the reported attitude toward that CS and toward the other CS. 
To test that hypothesis, we looked at the 25 correlations between the five attitude 
extremity and five memory confidence scores (i.e., the absolute score of the attitude 
responses and of the memory responses pertaining to each of the two CSs and three 
fillers). The five strongest correlations were the correlations between the memory and the 
attitude measure that pertained to the same stimulus (e.g., the extremity of the memory 
response to Jigglypuff and the extremity of the attitude toward Jigglypuff). If individual 
differences in scale usage were the only reason for the relationship between attitude 
extremity and memory certainty, then the probability that the five strongest correlations 
in the memory-attitude extremity matrix would be the five relationships that shared the 
same stimulus would have been smaller than p = .0001. Therefore, it is clear that 
individual differences in scale usage were not the reason for the relationship observed in 
our research between the extremity of the attitude toward each stimulus and the 
confidence in the contingency memory regarding that stimulus. 
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Evidence for a Direct Link from Pairing to Contingency Awareness or EC 
 There was no EC without accurate contingency memory. Like in Experiment 1, 
participants with inaccurate contingency memory showed a reverse EC, matching their 
memory, not the actual contingencies, M = -.31, SD = 2.07, t(361) = -2.87, p = .004, d = -
.15. This time, however, the reverse EC was moderated by the number of pairings. A 
regression revealed that it was smaller when there were more pairings, ß = .13, t(359) = 
2.45, p = .01. The reverse EC was significant in the 4 pairings condition (M = -.54, SD = 
2.03), t(138) = -3.15, p = .002, d = -.26, and in the 8 pairings condition (M = -.44, SD = 
2.13), t(116) = -2.23, p = .03, d = -.21, but not in the 12 pairings condition (M = .12, SD = 
2.01), t(107) < 1, d = .06.  This change might be explained by the fact that among these 
inaccurate participants, the inaccuracy was marginally stronger in the 4 and 8 pairings 
conditions, Ms = -.22, -.22, (SDs = .35, .33) than in the 12 pairings condition, M = -.15 
(SD = .29), t(359) = 1.76, p = .08, d = .22.   
Participants who did not show EC still showed accurate contingency memory. 
Participants who did not prefer the CSpos over the CSneg showed a very small yet 
significantly accurate memory, M = 0.08, SD = 0.64, t(355) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .08. This 
was moderated by the number of pairings, ß = .15, t(353) = 2.78, p = .006, reflecting the 
fact that memory score was better than chance among people who showed no EC only in 
the 12-pairing condition, M = .23, SD = .71, t(106) = 3.26, p = .002, d = .32, (4 pairings, 
d = -.02; 8 pairings, d = .09). This may reflect the importance of contingency awareness 
in EC because, as reported earlier, the 12-pairing condition was the only condition that 
showed significant EC.  
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General Discussion 
In two experiments, pairing neutral CSs with valenced USs caused changes in 
liking and accurate memory of the CS-US contingencies. These effects were moderated 
by the number of pairings, but with an asymptote at 12 pairings beyond which more 
pairings did not affect EC or the accuracy of contingency memory. Despite the overall 
EC and above-chance contingency memory, many participants did not show preference 
for the CSpos over the CSneg, and many did not show accurate contingency memory. 
The variation in EC and memory was related. People who showed more accurate and 
more confident contingency memory also showed stronger EC. The evidence also 
suggested that contingency awareness affected EC, and that intentional processes 
contributed to that effect. We also found evidence that pre-existing attitudes affected 
contingency memory, suggesting that contingency memory is not exclusively affected by 
awareness of the pairing during the task. Finally, we found no evidence for EC without 
awareness, but contingency awareness was observed even without EC. We now discuss 
each of these four sets of findings in more detail and end with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings for models of EC. 
Overall Effects  
In both experiments, we observed significant EC and contingency awareness. 
Because we manipulated the number of CS-US pairings, our experiments provide 
information about the impact of the number of CS-US pairings on EC. As reviewed by 
De Houwer et al. (2001), a few studies found an increase in the magnitude of EC when 
the number of pairings increased (Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992; 
Sachs, 1975; Staats & Staats, 1959), but others found no effect (Martin & Levey, 1987; 
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Stuart, Shimp, & Engle, 1987). One study even suggested that EC effects decrease in 
magnitude after the number of pairings passes 20 (Baeyens et al, 1992).  
The present research found that EC was stronger and contingency memory more 
accurate when the number of pairings increased but only up to 12 pairings. Beyond that, 
no increase was observed with additional pairings. Further, among those who 
remembered the contingencies, the number of pairings did not change the magnitude of 
EC. When contingency memory was accurate, EC was equally strong in the 4 pairings (d 
= .47) and in the 12 pairings (d = .35) conditions. This may suggest that repetition of the 
pairings is unnecessary for EC after people already remember the contingencies. The 
reasons why memory would be important for EC might be related to the nature of the 
causal relationships between them. This is discussed in the next sections. 
Direct Effects of the Contingencies 
We found virtually no evidence that EC can occur without accurate memory of 
the contingency. Therefore, we do not have any evidence that CS-US pairings can 
directly affect EC without the mediation of contingency awareness. The fact that we did 
not find evidence for EC without contingency awareness is surprising considering past 
evidence to the contrary, and the fact that we modeled our procedure on previous 
research in which people showed EC without accurate contingency memory (Jones et al., 
2009; Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002, 2006). Based on that literature, we expected that with a 
sample size as large as ours, we would find EC with and without contingency awareness. 
In using large samples we aimed to ascertain that a null finding could not be easily 
attributed to lack of power. The fact that our results were replicated in two separate 
experiments further decreases the likelihood of such possibility.  
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Assuming that past demonstrations of EC in the absence of contingency 
awareness are not due to statistical “flukes”, one might argue that differences in certain 
procedural elements were responsible for the divergent results. One important difference 
might be the measurement of contingency awareness. The present research measured 
valence awareness (Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009), in which participants were questioned 
about the valence of the US with which a CS was paired rather than the specific identity 
of the US. In comparison, in their studies, Olson and Fazio (2001, 2002) used an identity 
memory test, in which participants were questioned about specific identity of the US with 
which a CS was paired. The fact that Olson and Fazio found EC without accurate 
memory and we did not is in line with recent findings showing that identity memory is 
not necessary for EC, whereas valence awareness is necessary (Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; 
Stahl, Unkelbach & Corneille, 2009).7   
Another possible factor that may affect the role of contingency awareness in EC is 
the evaluative strength of the USs (Jones et al., 2009). Jones and colleagues argued that 
contingency awareness is necessary for EC only when the USs are strongly evocative. In 
line with this claim, some (but not all) of the stimuli in our experiments were similar to 
those identified as strongly evocative by Jones and colleagues. However, these stimuli 
were the same as those used as USs in the other demonstrations of EC without accurate 
contingency memory (Olson & Fazio, 2001, 2002, 2006). Therefore, more research is 
warranted before one can be confident that the strength of the evaluative reaction to the 
USs is a critical parameter that determines the role of contingency awareness in EC. It is, 
however, difficult to exclude the possibility that our failure to find EC in the absence of 
contingency awareness is due to other subtle aspects of our procedure. Nevertheless, 
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because of the large power of the statistical tests, our data do provide a genuine failure to 
observe EC in the absence of contingency awareness. This demonstrates that EC in the 
absence of contingency awareness may be observed only under certain conditions. 
Maintaining the claim that EC can occur in the absence of contingency awareness will 
require delineating the conditions under which such effects can be observed.  
The Effect of Contingency Memory on EC 
An important new finding of our studies was that some participants reported to 
have intentionally used the CS-US contingencies as a basis for evaluating the CSs. These 
people also showed a stronger relationship between contingency awareness and EC, and, 
more generally, they showed stronger EC effects. Without these people, EC was not 
significant in either of the experiments. This evidence is based on self-report. However, 
people do not always attribute their behavior to the correct causes (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Therefore, an alternative account of these findings – a retrospective inference 
account – is that when contingency memory and attitudes were more similar, people 
inferred that they must have used the contingencies as a source for the evaluation of the 
stimuli. That is, they observed the memory-EC relationship and inferred (rather than 
experienced) that EC is the result of deliberate reliance on the observed contingencies 
when evaluating the CSs.  
We judge the reliance on memory account as more likely than the retrospective 
inference account for the two following reasons. First, in Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) 
studies, people failed to attribute their behaviors to causes that correlated with the 
measured effect (across participants), and reported causes that did not actually correlate 
with the effects. In our studies, contingency memory and EC correlated, and participants 
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who reported remembering indeed showed stronger memory-EC correlation. Therefore, a 
self-misattribution process in our experiments would be more extreme than those found 
in the past: it would require the participants to correctly detect a correlation but then 
confuse the cause with the effect by claiming an intentional process that actually never 
happened. Our interpretation is the more simple assumption that although people have 
limited self-knowledge, there are many processes about which they can report correctly 
(Smith & Miller, 1978), and that intentionally relying on contingencies memory when 
rating the CSs is one such process.  
The second argument for our conclusion that contingency memory affected EC is 
based on a simple line of reasoning: (a) The finding that people tended to show accurate 
contingency memory even when they did not prefer the CSpos over the CSneg suggests a 
genuine memory of the pairings (i.e., not inferred based on EC); and, (b) The finding that 
some people reported using the contingencies for evaluating the CSs suggests that they 
thought that contingencies were a basis for evaluation. Therefore, there is little reason to 
assume that people who had this belief and also remembered the contingencies did not 
put their belief into practice, and actually relied on the contingencies when evaluating the 
stimuli.  
Further evidence suggests that some participants relied on the contingency 
because they thought that the researchers expected them to do so. Reporting demand was 
related to stronger memory-attitude relationship and stronger EC. Therefore, it seems that 
some people noticed the contingency, and believed that the expected behavior in this 
study was to evaluate the CSs according to the contingency. This is a disconcerting 
artifact of the experimental settings and does not reflect the kind of attitude formation 
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that most researchers who use EC procedure wish to study. Our results illustrate how 
important it is that researchers always carefully assess whether participants show demand 
compliance. 
The Effect of Attitudes on Contingency Memory 
We found that pre-existing attitudes affected contingency memory. In the control 
conditions, stimuli that were not paired with valenced USs were still remembered by 
some people as if they have been paired. Importantly, this false contingency memory was 
related to the attitude that people had toward those stimuli. We think that this relationship 
was not due to false memory shaping the attitudes because the memory was biased. That 
is, people tended to remember that one set of stimuli was paired with positive USs and 
that another set of stimuli were paired with negative USs. Specifically, people tended to 
remember that liked stimuli were paired with positive USs, and disliked stimuli were 
paired with negative USs. A similar memory bias in the conditions that did pair the two 
CSs with valenced USs suggested that pre-existing attitudes affect contingency memory 
in that case as well.  
These findings suggest that like other memory tasks (Johnson, Hashtroudi & 
Lindsay, 1993), contingency memory is prone to confabulation and source errors (see 
also Tomarken, Mineka & Cook, 1989). Additionally, and most important to EC 
research, it suggests that attitudes are a source for memory report and thus contaminate 
the most commonly used measurement of awareness. Although our research could not 
test this directly, it is reasonable to assume that in addition to pre-existing attitudes, 
attitudes that are the result of EC can also affect contingency memory. In fact, this may 
happen even if the EC is the result of intentional usage of contingency memory, as found 
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in the present investigation. In that case, the newly formed attitude can serve as another 
cue to help people remember the contingency.  
It is obvious, however, that not all contingency awareness in our research was 
caused by EC. Even people who showed no EC still showed significantly accurate 
contingency memory. This suggests that they had actually noticed the pairing and did not 
confabulate it based on their attitudes. Related to that, people who showed preference for 
the CSneg over the CSpos did not show a reversed contingency memory. Finally, 
considering our findings about the intentional reliance on memory, it seems unlikely that 
EC caused false contingency awareness that then caused people to believe that they 
intentionally used their contingency knowledge in order to evaluate the CS. Nevertheless, 
it might be the case that we, and others, have failed to find EC without contingency 
awareness because EC sometimes causes accurate contingency memory that is then 
interpreted as contingency awareness.  
Implications for models of EC 
Until recently, EC was most often explained in terms of the automatic formation 
of associations in memory between the representation of the CS and (certain elements of) 
the representation of the US (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Crombez, 1995; Jones, Fazio, & 
Olson, 2009; see Martin & Levey, 1978, for a related account). These association 
formation models have been challenged by propositional models according to which EC 
is mediated by the formation of propositions about the CS-US relation (De Houwer, 
2007, 2009; De Houwer et al., 2005; Mitchell et al., 2009; Pleyers et al., 2007). Unlike 
CS-US associations, propositions about CS-US relations are formed in a conscious, 
controlled manner. Therefore, whereas association formation models of EC predict that 
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EC can occur automatically, propositional models lead to the prediction that EC is non-
automatic in that it requires the presence of contingency awareness, processing resources, 
goals, and time (see De Houwer, 2009, for details).  
Recent studies provide support for the non-automatic nature of EC in showing the 
EC occurs only in the presence of contingency awareness (e.g., Dawson et al., 2007; 
Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2009), attention resources (Pleyers et al., 2009), and 
appropriate processing goals (Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009). The fact 
that we also failed to find EC in the absence of contingency awareness supports the 
conclusion that EC is based on non-automatic processes and thus adds to the evidence for 
propositional models of EC. As noted above, our results go beyond previous failures to 
observe unaware EC in that the lack of unaware EC in our study cannot be attributed to a 
lack of power.  
The main theoretical contribution of our research is, however, the evidence it 
provides for one possible way in which propositions about CS-US contingencies can lead 
to EC effects. Some researchers (Baeyens et al., 2009; Shanks, 2007) have criticized 
propositional models of EC by pointing out that these models do not specify a plausible 
mechanism by which propositions about CS-US relations can lead to EC. De Houwer et 
al. (2005) argued that participants might intentionally use such propositions in to justify 
their evaluation the CSs. For example, the fact that a CS repeatedly goes together with a 
negative US might be seen as a negative property of the CS and thus as a valid reason for 
disliking the CS. Our data provide the first evidence to support this idea. First, the fact 
that a significant proportion of the participants indicated that they did use their memory 
of the CS-US contingencies for determining the liking of the CSs shows that it is not 
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unreasonable to assume that participants regard knowledge about CS-US contingencies as 
a source of information for determining their evaluation of the CSs. Second, the fact that 
the magnitude of EC was related to self-reports about reliance on memory is difficult to 
explain without the assumption that participant actually used their knowledge of the 
contingencies when evaluating the stimuli.  
Our results, however, do not allow for the conclusion that all instances of EC are 
due to the intentional use of contingency knowledge. In addition to the fact that it is 
difficult to prove such general statements, we observed significant EC in participants who 
reported that they did not base their evaluations on knowledge of the CS-US 
contingencies, but exhibited accurate contingency memory. Although one could argue 
that people sometimes fail to verbalize their conscious knowledge, this observation does 
suggests that intentionally using contingency knowledge is not necessary in order to 
obtain EC. It is important to realize, however, that propositional models are not 
incompatible with the idea that propositions can lead to EC in an unintentional manner. 
The core of these models is the assumption that EC is mediated by the non-automatic 
formation of propositions about CS-US contingencies. This implies that CS-US pairings 
can influence the liking of a CS only after a conscious proposition has been formed about 
the CS-US contingency. It does not imply, however, that the effect of the proposition on 
the liking of the CS is intentional. Once a proposition has been formed, it could in 
principle influence the liking of the CS also unintentionally, that is, independent of 
whether participants have the goal to take the proposition into account when evaluating 
the CSs. For instance, merely endorsing the proposition that a CS was paired with 
positive stimuli might be sufficient to result in a liking of that CS even when there is no 
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intention to change the liking of the CS on the basis of that proposition. Future research is 
necessary to determine whether propositions about CS-US contingencies can have these 
unintentional effects. Our data do show, however, that at least in some cases, EC results 
from an intentional use of conscious propositional knowledge about CS-US 
contingencies.  
Conclusion 
Our data allow for three conclusions. First, they confirm the conclusion that EC is 
related to contingency awareness. Our data add to previous evidence on this issue by 
demonstrating the absence of EC in the absence of contingency awareness even with 
extremely powerful statistical tests. The results also demonstrate for the first time that the 
impact of number of CS-US pairings on EC is modulated by contingency awareness. This 
may suggest that increasing the number of pairings has an effect on EC only because it 
increases the probability that participants become aware of the contingencies. Second, we 
demonstrate for the first time that EC is related to self-reports regarding the intentional 
use of contingency knowledge. These results support the conclusion that EC is at least in 
some cases due to the fact that participants use contingency knowledge to determine their 
liking of the CSs. Third, contingency memory is not an exclusive measure of contingency 
awareness. Several aspects of our results show that attitudes towards CSs can bias 
memory about CS-US contingencies. The first and second of these conclusions are in line 
with propositional models of EC.  
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Footnotes
                                                 
1  The effect sizes of the EC reported by Olson and Fazio (2001, 2002, 2006; Jones, Fazio 
& Olson, 2009) were usually around d = .30, ranging from d = .14 (Jones, Fazio & 
Olson, 2009, Study 1) to d = .37 (Olson & Fazio, 2001, Experiment 1, measured with an 
IAT). The EC effect sizes in our experiments were within this range. 
7 Olson and Fazio (2001) also examined whether participants who did not choose the 
correct US in the identity memory test, at least chose the US of the same valence. They 
found EC even without participants who showed this kind of awareness. Still, this is not 
the same valence awareness measure used by us and by Stahl et al. (2009; Stahl & 
Unkelbach, 2009). That is, Olson and Fazio did not ask the participants directly what 
valence was paired with each CS. Additionally, Jones, Fazio and Olson (2009) reported 
that they removed from their analyses participants who showed valence awareness in 
their response to an open-ended post-experimental question regarding the rules they 
noticed in the learning procedure. But of course, a question in an open-ended format is 
not the same as the valence awareness measure used by us and by Stahl and colleagues. 
Notice also that we probed for participants' awareness of the rules of stimuli presentations 
in a multiple-choice format (the manipulation awareness), and found no EC without 
manipulation awareness. 
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Table 1 
The effect of contingency on attitude and memory as a function of number of pairings 
Study 
number of 
pairings 
N EC  
Memory 
Accuracy 
1 0 197 n/a n/a 
1 12 200 .65a** (2.27) .60 a** (1.13) 
1 22 213 .35 a** (2.57) .66 a** (1.18) 
1 32 199 .60 a** (2.20) .74 a** (1.23) 
1 Overall 612 .53** (2.36) .67** (1.18) 
2 4 232 -.02a (2.15) .12 a* (.66) 
2 8 213 .32 ab* (2.28) .23 a** (.71) 
2 12 212 .48 b** (2.24) .37 b** (.76) 
2 Overall 657 .25** (2.23) .23** (.72) 
Notes. (a) Within each study, the subscripts indicate values that are not significantly 
different; (b) EC is the difference between the evaluations of CSpos and CSneg, each on 
a 9-point scale, when positive values indicate EC consistent with training; (c) Memory 
accuracy is the average of the level of confidence that CSpos was paired with positive 
valence and that CSneg was paired with negative valence, each on a scale that ranged 
from -2.5 to 2.5, positive values indicate accurate memory on average; values in 
parentheses are standard deviations. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
